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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of negotiable instruments law chronicles a strong
infatuation with form. 1 While the formal requirements for negotiabil-

• Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law.
•• Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans,
Louisiana. The authors wish to thank Professor Patricia! Fry for reviewing an
earlier draft of this Article.
1. Professor Gilmore, in summing up the popular perception of negotiability,
states: "Few generalizations have been more often repeated, or by generations of
lawyers more devoutly believed, than this: negotiability is a matter rather of form
than substance." Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase,
63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1068 (1954). Gilmore, however, perceives things differently:
Few generalizations, legal or otherwise, have ever been less true; the
truth is, in this as in every other field of commercial law, substance has
always prevailed over form. "The law," has always been in a constant
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ity are not dictated by any one overriding explanatory principle, 2
they seem to have gathered strength historically in a society plagued
by a shortage of currency and increasingly oriented towards the market transactions that made currency important. 3 For an instrument
to function as a money substitute it was believed that its value must
be clearly reflected on its face. This meant, at a minimum, that the
amount payable and the time of payment had to be specified with
certainty, and the obligation to pay, unconditional. 4 Negotiable instruments law and a world-wide market economy came of age together.
Today, the formal requirements for negotiable instruments are
found in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 5 With only mi-

state of flux as it struggles to adjust itself to changing methods of business practice; what purport to be formal rules of abstract logic are merely
ad hoc responses to particular situations.
Id. at 1069.
2. See Fred Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3,
and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REv. 531 (1951).
3. This explanation of the forces behind the birth of negotiability has long
been recagnized. Gilmore summarized it this way:
The radically new problems all stemmed from the industrial revolution
and the vastly increased number of commercial transactions which it
spawned. When goods were shipped they had to be paid for. The idea that
payments could be made in metallic currency, chronically in short supply,
was ludicrous. The primitive banking system could not cope with the situation: The bank check which-a hundred years later-became the universal payment device was unknown. In effect the merchants and bankers
invented their own currency. The form which they used was an old one:
the so-called bill of exchange which was an order issued by one person
(the drawer) to a second person (the drawee) directing the drawee to pay
a specified sum of money at a specified time to a third person (the holder). . . . These bills moved in a world-wide market, typically ending up in
the possession of people who knew nothing about the transaction which
had given rise to the bill, had no way of finding out anything about the
transaction and, in any case, had not the slightest interest in it.
Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 441, 447-448 (1979). See also FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE
LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND NOTES 2-3 (2d ed. 1992) ("In the years
during which the form requirements were being fashioned, the law wished to promote the free transfer of negotiable instruments because negotiable instruments
that passed from hand to hand in payment of debts were used to supplement the
otherwise inadequate money supply").
4. Thua, derives the now familiar maxim that an instrument to be negotiable must be "a courier without luggage." Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846).
5. Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations to "the Code" or
"U.C.C." in this article are to the official text and comments of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1990).
Bear in mind that although we limit our discussion to Article 3, the law of
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nor variations these are the same basic requirements that were developed at common law and were later embraced by the Negotiable
Instruments Law of 1896.6 To put this point another way, "time
seems to have been suspended, nothing has changed, the late twentieth century law of negotiable instruments is still a law for clipper
ships and their exotic cargo from the Indies."7 To be negotiable under
Article 3, the instrument must: be written;8 be signed by the maker
or drawer;9 contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation, or power
given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by Article 3; 10 be
payable on demand or at a definite time; 11 and be payable to order
or to bearer." 12
What was evidently overlooked by the drafters in their "antiquarian zeal" 13 was the spectacular growth in the use of electronic
communication technologies. We have evolved from a· paper-based
world in which clipper ships roamed the seas to one in which information is organized and structured into electronic messages. 14 The
question arises as to whether the traditional formalities of negotiable
instruments law can be harmonized with the inexorable march of
commercial practice towards electronic commerce. In the course of
assessing the ability of existing paper-based legal requirements to
accommodate technological change, a number of difficult issues arise.
By far the most intractable issues are whether the electronic message
can be brought within the definition of a "writing" 15 and whether it

negotiability is not so limited. For example, section 3-102 states: "This Article
applies to negotiable instruments. It does not apply to money, to payment orders
governed by Article 4A, or to securities governed by Article 8.n u.c.c. § 3-102.
6. Unfortunately, much about the history of the Negotiable Instruments
Law of 1896 (N.l.L.) remains shrouded in mystery. See Gilmore, supra note 3, at
457 ("I do not know whether the banks drafted the N.l.L. The truth is that no
one knows anything about the drafting of the N.l.L.: it was carried out almost in
secret.n).
7. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 448.
8. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(6), (9); 3-104{a).
9. Id. §§ 3-103(aX6), (9); 3-304(a).
10. Id. § 3-104(a).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 461 n.44. Gilmore refers to Article 3 as "a museum of antiquities-a treasure house crammed full of ancient artifacts whose use
and function have long since been forgotten.n Id. at 461.
14. See generally Amelia H. Boss, The International Commercial Use of
Electronic Data Interchange and Electronic Communications Technologies, 46 Bus.
LAW. 1787 (1991).
15. U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (" 'Written' or 'writing,' includes printing, typewriting
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can satisfy the definition of a "signature." 16 A number of commentators have addressed these vexing issues, but there seems to be little
consensus on the proper disposition. 17 For their part, courts continue
to reach ad hoc determinations rather than principled resolutions. 18
It is not inopportune therefore to take stock of Article 3's formalities and the premises upon which they rest. In order to do more than
restate the arguments for or against each prerequisite for negotiability, it seems necessary, even at this late date, to take a second look at
the first principle of negotiability. This principle is most often referred to as the "merger" principle. 19 This is the idea that an abstract and intangible form of wealth has been transformed into a
tangible piece of paper with an obvious physical presence. The upshot
of such a transformation is that the rights embodied in the paper can
only be transferred by a transfer of the paper itself.
The approach adopted here is both historical and analytical.
Part II of this Article describes the historical development of assignment law, and demonstrates that it parallels a more general shift of
the law away from physical conceptions of property. It concludes that
although a paper-based document may still be a practical requirement, there is no longer a valid theoretical justification for not making the law of negotiable instruments media neutral.
In Part III we survey the features of negotiable instrument law
and compare it generally with the _law of assignments. This comparison suggests that the most striking substantive difference between
the two systems is the doctrine of good faith purchase. In simple
terms, this is the idea that a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable

or any other intentional reduction to tangible form.").
16. Id. § 1-201(39) (" 'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a
party with present intention to authenticate a writing.").
17. For a collection of views with respect to "writing" and "signature" issues
relating to the Statute of Frauds of section 2-201, see Sharon F. DiPaolo, Note,
The Application of the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 Statute of Frauds
to Electronic Commerce, 13 J.L. & COM. 143 (1993). With respect to "writing" and
"signature" issues relating to letters of credit, see Task Force on the Study of
U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5, 45 Bus. LAW. 1521 (1990).
18. For example, compare Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C.
1989), affd sub nom; Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1993 WL
304567 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that a "record" under the Federal Records Act
includes electronic data stored on Magnetic tapes) with Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Sylvan
State Bank, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 961 (Kan. 1994) (holding that an
electronic fund transfer is not a writing).
19. See Gilmore, supra note 3, at 449. Other commentators have given it
other names. For example, Robert Clark has referred to it as the "paperization"
principle. See Robert Charles Clark, Abstract Rights uersus Paper Rights under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445 (1975).
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instrument takes it free from all outstanding claims, including contract defenses.
Finally, in Part IV we explore the extent to which the consequences of the good faith purchase doctrine can be replicated outside
of the negotiability system. We conclude that even in a paper-based
legal environment, this key feature of negotiability is readily attainable by parties employing electronic technologies.

II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ASSIGNMENT LAW
Throughout most of the history of the common law, the contractual right to payment of a sum of money was not assignable to a
party who was not a party to the original contract. 20 In contrast,
today contract rights generally are freely assignable. Indeed, the law
has gone so far as to restrict the scope of permissible contractual
prohibitions on the right to assign. 21
Three traditional explanations for the rule against assignability
have been suggested. First, it has been widely suggested that the
restriction on assignment was based on an embedded judicial fear of
potential abuse which could occur if legal rights were assigned to
persons in a more powerful or influential position and who could use
that position unlawfully to enforce the newly acquired right: a fear of
maintenance. 22 Whether the fear of maintenance was actually the
reason for the rule against assignability is questionable: "[T]his could
not be so, since it is clear that the rule prohibiting assignments antedates the law relating to maintenance." 23 Yet it appears clear that
the fear of maintenance slowed down the development of the law
regarding the assignment of contracts. 24 This, combined with the
technicalities of the common law procedures, the expense of legal

20. The prohibition of assignment of contract rights was not peculiar to the
common law: "Ancient German law, like ancient Roman law, sees great difficulty
in the way of an assignment of debt or other benefit of a contract. The assignee
who sued the debtor would be met by the plea 'I never bound myself to pay money to you.' " 2 POLWCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 226
(2d ed. 1978). The reasons for the prohibition are shrouded in history. See
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 780 (2d ed. 1990); MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 788 (3d ed.
1990).
21. See U.C.C. § 9-318(4) ("A term in any contract between an account debtor and as assignor is ineffective if it prohibits assignment.").
22. W.S. Holdsworth, The Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common
Law, 33 HARV. L. REY. 997, 1006 (1920); Winfield, History of Maintenance and
Champerty, 35 LAW Q. REv. 50 (1919).
23. MURRAY, supra note 20, at 789.
24. See HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 534 (1925); J.B. Ames, Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REY. 337 (1890).
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proceedings, and the ease with which jurors and other law enforcement personnel could be corrupted or intimidated, directed courts to
repeatedly prohibit all practices which favored maintenance. 25
It has also been suggested that early common law lawyers had
difficulty thinking in abstractions, and therefore could notconceive of
the transfer of an intangible contract right. 26 However, "the incapacity of early lawyers to corporialize the incorporeal has been greatly
over-stressed by modern writers. Medieval lawyers were perfectly
capable of visualizing ownership of disembodied interests-ownership
of an office, the right to appoint a parson to a particular church, right
to labor [or] services in homes or in the fields, rights to be paid annuities, to collect tolls from passersby, or to occupy a front seat at the
king's coronation."27
Finally, it has been suggested that contract rights under the
ancient writs were personal in nature and could not be transferred.
The assignment of a contract right is a species of a chose in action; a
chose in action being all personal rights which cannot be claimed or
enforced by the taking of physical possession: in other words, an
intangible. 28 Historically, choses in action were those personal
claims based on obligations which arose from the writs of debt, detinue, or trespass. 29 These writs were construed narrowly, and the

25. Holdsworth, supra note 22, at 1007. See also Garrard Glenn, The Assignment of Choses in Action: Rights of a Bona Fide Purchaser, 20 VA. L. REV. 621
(1934).
26. See F.W. Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAW. Q. REV. 481 (1886).
27. J. DAWSON, ET AL, CASES AND COMMNETS ON CONTRACTS 902 (5th ed.
1987). See also, Percy Bordwell, The Alienability of Non-Possessory Interests, 19
N.C. L. REY. 279 (1941).
28. Holdsworth, supra note 22. See also Torkington v. Magee, 2 KB. 427,
430 (1902).
29. See Holdsworth, supra note 22, at 1001; 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 219-20 (5th ed. 1972). The oldest writ, covenant, appeared to promise a form of action applicable to contracts. However, the requirement of a seal
and a remedy of only specific performance proved to be unpopular. FIFOOT'S LAW
OF CONTRACTS 13-14 (9th ed. 1976). AB early as the twelfth century, the common
law courts recognized the writ of debt. The writ of debt could be used to recover
the value of a breached obligation. W.T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN
EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY 26-28 (1914). For example, the writ could be used by a
lender to recover money lent or by a seller to recover the purchase price of goods
sold. The writ of debt, however, was restricted to recovering specific goods or their
value. KESSLER, ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 25 (3d ed. 1990). Thus,
out of commercial necessity the writ of detinue soon developed so that a fixed sum
could be recovered. Id. AB with most of the early common law writs, detinue was
based on the concept of the transfer of property. Accordingly, detinue allowed for
recovery of property losses and debt allowed for recovery of contractual obligations.
W.T. BARBOUR, supra, at 26-28.
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rights which could be claimed under them were deemed personal
rights, and, as such, belonged solely to the person who created them.
Whether the action arose from what would now be classified as a
contractual obligation or a tort was of no concern; at common law,
the right of action was a personal matter between two persons which
could not be sold or assigned. 30
Whatever the reason for it, the general prohibition against assignment persisted generally until the 1800's. However, the common

Debt and detinue covered a very considerable area of contract law including the sale of goods, bailments, and loans of money. Covenant. was appropriate for the residue of the promises. However, because of a reluctance to change
the rigid requirements of these writs, contractual rights which were not based on
the specific transfer of property were not enforceable.
By the end of the fourteenth century, the writ of trespass on the case
developed. A. W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE
RISE OF THE ACTION OF AsSUMPSIT 199, 273-74 (1975) [hereinafter SIMPSON, COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT]. This writ allowed the transfer not only of actual property
rights but also abstract contractual obligations. A W.B. SIMPSON, EMERGENCE OF
CONTRACT LAW 200 (1975) [hereinafter SIMPSON, EMERGENCE OF CONTRACT LAW].
The characteristic feature of this action was that a plaintiff was allowed to claim
damages by way of compensation for a wrong which had caused him harm, and
the liability could be based upon a prior informal transaction which the other
party had entered into with the plaintiff. In this respect, trespass on the case
actions embodied a legal technique which was qajte different from the technique of
the ancient contractual action of debt, detinue, and covenant, where the claimant
could only demand recovery of tangible property. SIMPSON, COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT, supra, at 199-205.
From the writ of trespass on the case, a species of case known as assUmpsit developed. The assumpsit, or undertaking, played an important role in actions
on the case. Soon assumpsit encroached on the domain of all the writs. This radical change in legal doctrine was accomplished with remarkable rapidity. SIMPSON,
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT, supra, at 249. By the seventeenth century, assumpsit
had acquired its own identity and became a regular common law contractual doctrine. Assumpsit became an action for the breach of informal agreements or covenants and it became almost the sole remedy for contracts by parol that did not
involve a bailment. SIMPSON, COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT, supra, at 299. The modern English law of contract has grown up around an action of assumpsit.
Thus, the law of contract in general had moved from a rigid emphasis on
actual property rights to a recognition of abstract contractual obligations. See generally, MORTON J. HQRWITl, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860,
160-210 (1977). This evolution of the law of contract had developed along similar
lines of the law of negotiable instruments. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note
20, at 184-233.
30. 2 SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 850 (1846); J.B. AMES, THE INALIENABILITY OF CHOSES IN ACTION, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 210 (1913). However,
a party entitled to such a right could release it to the person against whom it
could be brought, and it could have as easily been dissolved as it was created.
Holdsworth, supra note 22, at 1003 n.23.
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law began to succumb to the pressure to permit free assignability of
certain limited legal rights much earlier. For example, as early as the
fourteenth century, merchants began to circumvent the common law
prohibition on the assignment of rights by clever application of the
technicalities of the common law writs. 31 Typically, a merchant
would assign a right to receive a sum of money to an assignee who he
would appoint as his attorney to sue for the debt. The appointment of
the creditor contained a stipulation that the attorney should keep the
amount received on the suit. 32
Also, by the fifteenth century certain claims, which were in reality choses in . action involving personal rights, were categorized as
actions to recover property, and therefore as real (as opposed to personal or intangibles) actions. Unlike actions for personal rights, assignments of real actions were recognized. 33 Accordingly, a husband
could release hls wife's right to previously bailed property to the
bailee, and this contract of sale was viewed as giving a right to receive possession instead of the more obvious and accurate description
of the right to transfer ownership of goods already possessed. 34 Categorized as a property right, it was freely assignable. 35
During the seventeenth century, assignees began to bring their
claims in the courts of chancery. The chancery courts, which apparently did not have the same antipathy to assignment as did the common law courts, recognized the assignee as the owner of the claim,
and not merely as the assignor's agent. 36 The common law courts
were not insensitive to the encroachment on their domain, and the
acceptance of assignments in the common law courts soon followed. 37
Nonetheless, the most powerful legal tool to avoid the prohibi-

31. The writ system was burdened by formalities. In so far as it was possible to bring contractual actions, the possibility depended upon the existence of a
suitable form of action. Thus medieval lawyers were required to manipulate the
chose in action to accommodate the formulary writ system. SIMPSON, COMMON LAW
OF CONTRACT, supra note 29, at 4.
32. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 226.
33. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 1004. In 1431, Justice
Paston stated that "if I bailed to you a deed to rebail to me, and then I grant the
same deed to B, I shall not have writ of detinue against you after this grant, but
the said B will have the writ of detinue." Y.B. 9 Hy. VI Hil. pl.17 (1431). Furthermore, in 1491, the validity of a gift by a bailor seems to be maintained by
Vavisor. Y.B. 9 Hy. VII Mich. pl.4 (pp. 8-9) (1491).
34. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 24, at 282-84.
35. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 24, at 282-84.
36. Peters v. Soame, 23 Eng. Rep. 874 (Ch. 1701); Fashon v. Atwood, 22
Eng. Rep. 819 (Ch. 1679).
37. Winch v. Keely, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284 (KB. 1787).
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tion on the assignment of debts was the development of negotiable instruments. The rise of the importance of negotiable instruments was
a rapid and necessary one. The industrial revolution dramatically
increased the number of commercial transactions which created a
need for a means of paying for huge numbers of goods in an economy
where metallic money was chronically in short supply. In response to
this, bankers and mercJ;iants used bills of exchange and other negotiable instruments. 38
38. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 441, 447. A bill of exchange is an uncondition·
al order in writing, issued by one person (the drawer) to a second person (the
drawee), directing the first person to pay a sum certain at a specified time to a
third person (the holder). THOMAS C. SIMONTON, THE LAW OF CHECKS, NOTES, AND
BANKS 121 (2d ed. 1906). One of the first true negotiable instruments, the bill of
exchange was first used by the bankers and merchants of Florence and Venice to
facilitate the transfer of credit between distant points. In the fourteenth century,
bills of exchange came to England by way of France and the Civil law. JAMES M.
OGDEN, THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20 (4th ed. 1938). Originally, bills
of exchange were used to avoid sending money out of or into the country. The
merchant paid a third party by giving an order on one of his foreign debtors. In
addition to facilitating international transactions, though, bills of exchange also
provided an effective method for eluding the common law rule that a debt is not
assignable. Bills of exchange provided the assignee with an assignment binding on
the original creditor, capable of being ratified by the debtor, and assignable still
further. Moreover, the validity of a debt was proven by its authentication in a bill.
of exchange. A bill of exchange reduced the debt to a sum certain, affording an
indisputable title to the whole debt. JOHN B. BYLES, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF
BILLS OF ExCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, BANK-NOTES, BANKERS' CASH-NOTES AND
CHECKS x-xi (4th ed. 1856).
Although in 1603, the first negotiable instruments case was heard in the
common law courts involving the enforceability of a bill of exchange, Martin v.
Boure, 79 Eng. Rep. 6 (K.B. 1603), it was another 150 years before the courts
fully recognized that negotiable instruments should be exempt from defenses in the
underlying transaction. In Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758), the King's
Court recognized that when a bank note came into the possession of a holder, for
full and valuable consideration and in the normal course of business, without
knowledge that is was stolen, the bank note should be treated as money and not
as goods, giving bank notes the credit and currency of money. Id. at 452. Later, in
Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 K.B. 633 (1781), it was held that like a bill of exchange, a
stolen promissory note that passes into the possession of a good faith holder is not
subject to the underlying transaction. Id.
Within the last century, the law of negotiable instruments reached maturity. England codified the law of negotiable instruments in 1882 with the English
Bills of Exchange Act. In the United States, the earliest codification of negotiable
instruments was in the California Civil Code of 1872. JAMES MATLOCK OGDEN,
THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 23 (4th ed. 1938). In 1896, the National
Conference of Commissioners on.Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, broadly based on the English Bills of Exchange Act. These
statutes contained the fundamental principles and essential definitions of the law
of negotiable instruments and provided a set of standards for formal requisites of
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Because of the widespread use and utility of negotiable instruments, the necessity of using basic contract assignment principles to
achieve the same commercial results, as we suggest in this article,
has not been closely examined. Yet, it is clear that whatever the
formalistic reasons were which justified a prohibition against the
assignment of contract rights, the law has developed in directions
fully contrary to those reasons. Therefore, if the commercial goals
sought, such as the protections afforded parties through the negotiable instruments law, can be achieved through the established doctrines of contract assignment, such an approach should be considered
as a viable legal alternative to achieving those goals. Furthermore,
and more important, if the same protections afforded a party under
the law of negotiable instruments can be achieved through the law of
contract, the formal requirement of a paper driven transaction, as is
now required in the negotiable instruments law, may be dispensed
with. In this way, the present law can accommodate electronic transfers without any diminution of protection to the parties.
Moreover, modern contract law has developed into the perfect
vehicle for the transfer of the right to the payment of money (as opposed to the actual payment of money). Such a statement is so empirically obvious in the day to day world of contract law, that it hardly
would appear worth saying. But since the law of negotiable instruments is nothing more than the legal recognition of the right to the
payment of money, there exists a vast overlap in the two legal arenas. This should not be surprising because at the same time the
mercantile law of negotiable instruments was developing to provide a
commercial medium for the transfer of the right to payment of money, the law of contract in general was moving from a rigid emphasis
on physical, tangible property rights to a recognition of abstract contractual obligations. 39

negotiability, methods of transfer, rights of the holder, and liabilities of the par·
ties. Id. at 23.
At the time of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law's enactment, over
ninety per cent of the greatly expanding interstate commerce was handled by commercial paper, which created a need for uniformity in commercial paper law. By
eliminating conflicting negotiable instrument laws, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law facilitated interstate commerce, making business transactions less complicated. Id. at 24, 28. Today, Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code replaces
the NIL. By any standard, for the last century, the negotiable instruments law has
achieved the goal of facilitating and encouraging commerce. The law of negotiable
instruments is well understood and accepted.
39. Morton J. Horwitz, Historical Foundations of Modem Contract Law, 87
HARV. L. REv. 917 (1974); AW.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis & the History of
Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979).
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This can be seen in a comparison of modern legal conceptions of
property with an eighteenth century view of property. For example,
Blackstone's conception of property has two aspects or dimensions:
property can exist only in tangible things, and all propehy is absolute. Clearly, neither aspect is credible today. The idea that property
is limited to a collection of physical objects lost whatever force it had
as courts looked for ways to extend the protective umbrella of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and to protect
new forms of wealth. The best strategy they found was to designate
the interest involved as property. 40 Thus, we see our legal conception of property is such today that the same rights and protections
historically given to tangible property is generally accorded to intangible property. In this respect, to the degree that negotiable instruments allowed the transfer of intangible rights in a way that simple
contract law did not, this aspect of negotiable instruments law can
easily be achieved through the law of contract assignments.

III. A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS AND THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENTS
Can the law of the assignment of contracts operate as a fully
functional replacement to a negotiable instrument? We think so. In
this section, we briefly examine these two bodies of law and discuss
their basic similarities and differences.
The principle attributes of a negotiable instrument are: the paper must be freely assignable, the debt is "merged" into the paper
evidencing the claim, transfer can only be made by physical delivery
of the paper with evidence of the transferor's intent to make the
transfer, discharge of the debt can only be made by payment to the
person holding the instrument, creditors can only assert their claims
by getting legal possession of the paper, and the situs of the debt is
the physical location of the instrument. 41 The primary legal advantage bestowed by the law of negotiable instruments is the protection
afforded the "holder in due course" from defenses which could be
raised in the underlying transaction. 42 It is this protection, which we
40. See Dean G. Acheson, Book Review, 33 HARV. L. REV. 329, 330 (1919)
("Everything was thought of in terms of property, - reputation, privacy, domestic
relations, and as new interests called for protection, their success depended upon
their ability to take on the protective coloring of property.") (footnote omitted); see
also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modem Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 325 (1980) (discussing the extension of property protection to business goodwill, trademarks, trade
secrets, and oil and gas).
41. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1064.
42. For a holder of a negotiable instrument to be a holder in due course, the
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refer to as "essential negotiability," that is not automatically given
the assignee of a contract right, which is the primary and substantial
distinction between negotiable instruments law and the law of contract assignments. The holder in due course retains a favored legal
position as a bona fide purchaser for value who can take and enforce
negotiable instruments free of most claims and defenses. 43 Thus, the
legal status of holder in due course promotes transactions and encourages the rapid and unimpeded flow of capital.
In contrast, an assigned contract right places the assignee in the
same legal position as that of the assignor. Unlike the holder in due
course, the obligor can assert any claims or defenses against the
assignee which could have been asserted against the assignor regardless of whether the assignee knew of their existence at the tiµie of
the assignment or whether the claim existed at the time of the assignment.
There are other distinctions between a negotiable instrument
and a contract assignment, but the distinctions are not substantive.
The most obvious distinction between a negotiable instrument and a
contract assignment are the formalities of creating the legal right.
The formalities of a negotiable instrument are rigid and axiomatic."'
In contrast, assignments lack these formalities. In the absence of a
statute or contract term to the contrary, there are no prescribed
methods to make an effective assignment. The assignor must only
manifest his intention, either through words, conduct, or both, to
make a present transfer of his rights to the assignee. 45

holder must take the instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of
any defenses to the instrument itself. U.C.C. § 3-302.
However, even a holder in due course is subject to a very limited set of
defenses:
[A] defense of the obligor based on (i) infancy of the obligor to the extent
that it is a defense to a simple contract, (ii) duress, lack of legal capacity,
or illegality of the transaction which, under other law, nullifies the obligation of the obligor, (iii) fraud that induced the obligor to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to learn of
its character or its essential terms, or (iv) discharge of the obligor in
insolvency proceedings;
U.C.C. § 3-305(aX1).
43. Thus, for example, in the classic holder in due course situation, if the
purchaser of goods pays for the goods with a negotiable instrument, regardless of
whether the product proves defective, the product is never received, or the
product's sale is achieved fraudulently, a holder in due course of the negotiable
instrument is entitled to full payment on the instrument.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 5-12.
45. · This is not to say that no legal formalities are required to make an
effective assignment. There must be an intent to transfer a present, not future,
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This distinction, however, is merely one of form. The requirements of negotiable instruments go to the question of definiteness of
value, time of payment and the expression of who the parties are to
the agreement. There is no reason why a contract assignment could
not have the same level of specificity, and, at the same time, not
require the sine quo non of a negotiable instrument: a tangible written document. Therefore there is no substantive distinction between a
negotiable instrument and a contract assignment that would have
the' effect of negating the use of the law of contract assignments as a
substitute to negotiable instruments. 46
In addition, certainly at one time, transferability served as an
essential characteristic of negotiable instruments, and because simple
contract rights were not assignable, this was a distinguishing element between the two. Since the prohibition of the transfer of contract rights has been abolished, this aspect of negotiable instruments
has no particular contemporary significance. There is another major
distinction between a holder in due course and the assignee of a
contract right. The holder of a negotiable instrument automatically
receives the benefit of the contracts of endorsers to pay on the instrument upon dishonor47 as well as the prior transferor's implied warranties.48 A contractual assignee does not normally have these benefits.49

interest. An assignment must be a completed transaction between the parties
which is intended to vest in the assignee a present right. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 321 (1979).
46. In saying this, we do not wish to suggest that the lack of formalities in
assignments is not without consequences. As Professor Corbin explains, "It is not
always easy to determine whether the owner of a right has made an assignment,
or a mere promise to assign later on, or a promise to pay out of a fund to be
collected." 4 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 879, at 531 (1951). Furthermore, as Professor Gilmore reminds us, "Assignment law harshly requires a
contract obligor to determine, at his own risk, the validity of assignments of
claims against him." Grant Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and his Precarious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217, 227 (1964). However, for purposes of the argument we are making here, we do not deem this a problem, as it is assumed that
any contract and assignment of the rights of that contract that may be made pursuant to the ideas expressed in this article will be made with sufficient formalities
to show the express intent of the parties.
47. u.c.c. § 3-414(1).
48. Id. § 3-417(2).
49. See e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. E.T. Clancy Export Co., 612 F. Supp. 712,
715-16 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Depending on the circumstances of the assignment, an
assignor may implicitly make warranties which are comparable to those in U.C.C.
§ 3-417(2) for assignments "without recourse." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 333. These warranties do not run to subsequent assignees. Id. § 333(4). In addition, these warranties can be disclaimed. Id. § 333
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In addition, the simplified procedures of enforcement also distinguish the holder of a negotiable instrument from the assignee of a
contract. To enforce a negotiable instrument, a holder establishes a
prima facie case simply by producing the instrument. 50 An assignee
has to bring the more complicated traditional contract suit.
Moreover, a holder of a negotiable instrument receives specific
benefits simply by having possession of the instrument. Only the
person in possession of the instrument can discharge the underlying
debt. 51 This benefit is not equally accorded an assignee. Before the
notice of the assignment, payment to the assignor discharges the
obligor's duties. 52 In addition, claimants may assert claims by seeking garnishment against the obligor.53 And then there is the reoccurring and never resolved question of whether the assignor and obligor
can rearrange the debt after the assignment. 54
In sum, the advantages accorded a party under a negotiable
instrument which are not generally given to an assignee of a contract
right are, freedom from defenses in the underlying transaction, simplicity of proof of the right of payment, and certainty of the right of
payment on mere possession of the instrument. As we will discuss in
the next section, the advantages of essential negotiability can be
created for an assignee in a carefully drafted agreement between the
obligor and the assignor.
IV. NEGOTIABILITY BY CONTRACT
Thus far we have discussed the attributes of negotiability as if
their presence could only be found in a single legal universe-that is,
as if there were no parallel universe where one or more of these attributes could exist without the presence of an indispensable writing.
In fact, however, a coherent legal framework for negotiability without
paper is not only possible, it already exists. The 1977 amendments to
Article 8 of the Code were designed to accommodate for the first time
the uncertificated security. 55 In so doing, the drafters had to choose

cmt. b.
50. U.C.C. § 3-307(2). Furthermore, there is a presumption that all of the
signatures are valid. Id. § 3-307(1).
51. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 449-50.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 338(1).
53. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1067.
54. Gilmore, supra note 46, at 243-249.
55. The 1977 amendments are now incorporated in the 1990 Official Text of
the U.C.C. See generally Martin J. Aronstein, et al., Article 8 is Ready, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 889, 890-93 (1980) (discussing the history of the 1977 amendments). Interestingly, this new system of securities ownership envisioned by the drafters has
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between a system of non-negotiability based on the law's traditional
treatment of commercial intangibles, and a system of negotiability
based on the certificated security. In an effort to "facilitate the elimination or reduction in use of negotiable stock certificates,"56 the
drafters chose the latter system. 57 For the first time the world beheld the "negotiable non-instrument. "58
What bearing does the legal structure of Article 8 have on the
negotiability of intangibles generally? Two conclusions follow from
the development of the certificateless system. First, and most importantly, the legal system should be allowed to depart from current
commercial law and practice, certainly in the face of changed conditions, but also to reflect new views of policy. Second, new departures
should be accorded somewhat more deference than longstanding
practices if the departure is for reasons that have to do with technological change and new conceptions of property. But this is not to say
that courts are free do whatever they wish. Because much of commercial law has been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code, it is
clear that within a wide range the choice of policy is for the legislature.
For example, on the question of negotiability, the Code makes it
clear that the scope of Article 3 is defined by the definition of "negotiable instrument"59 and, despite the general ability of parties to

yet to materialize. With the exception of mutual fund shares, "virtually all other
forms of publicly traded corporate securities are still issued in certificated form."
U.C.C. REvlSED ARTICLE 8, Prefatory Note, at 2 (1994). Article 8 has again been
revised, this time to accommodate the evolution of the indirect holding system. See
id.
.
56. Aronstein, et al, supra note 55, at 890.
57. The decision to opt for a system of negotiability was based on the belief
that such a security would be more acceptable to the commercial community and
on the premise that cost and efficiency should be determinative of which type of
security to issue, not which form produces the better result for one of the parties
to a particular transaction. Aronstein, et al., supra note 55, at 893-94. But see
Peter F. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under revised Article 8
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1979) (criticizing the
1977 amendments).
58. Aronstein, et al., supra note 55, at 896.
59. Section 3-104 acts as the basic section defining the reach of Article 3. It,
however, cannot be read in isolation.
An instrument is either a "promise," defined in Section 3-103(a)(9), or "order," defined in Section 3-103(a)(6). A promise is a written undertaking to
pay money signed by the person undertaking to pay. An order is a written instruction to pay money signed by the person giving instruction.
Thus, the term "negotiable instrument" is limited to a signed writing that
orders or promises payment of money.
U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 1.
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vary by agreement the Code's provisions,60 this is one instance
where freedom of contract is restrained. 61 Whether or not a narrow
formulation of this restriction on the parties' contractual freedom is
desirable, it is still possible to find a place for an alternative system
of negotiability by exploring the relationship between that principle
and other Code provisions. Indeed, comment 2 to section 3-104 not
only suggests the application of Article 3 by analogy, 62 it raises the
possibility that the parties can, by appropriate contract, achieve some
or all of the attributes of negotiability. 63
In this Part, we discuss how the doctrine of good faith purchase
interacts with other principles and Code sections. We conclude that
the current restrictions on negotiability are overcome by methods
that permit the original parties to a transaction to create for them-

60. See id. § 1-102(3) ("The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by
agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act. . . .").
61. Comment 2 to section 1-102 so provides by stating that "private parties
cannot make an instrument negotiable within the meaning of Article 3 except as
provided in Section 3-104. . . ." Id. § 1-102 cmt. 2. See .also id. §§ 3-102(a) ("This
Article applies to negotiable instruments."), 3-104 cmt. 2 ("a writing cannot be
made a negotiable instrument within Article 3 by contract or conduct of the parties . . . .").
62. There are cases where the former Article 3 has been applied by analogy.
See, e.g., United States v. First National Bank, 263 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1967);
Sweeney v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 S.E.2d 858 (Va. 1983). In contrast, see European
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Starcrete International Industries, Inc., 613 F.2d
564 (5th Cir. 1980).
63. Comment 2 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Moreover, consistent with the principle stated in Section 1-102(2)(b), the
immediate parties to an order or promise that is not an instrument may
provide by agreement that one or more of the provisions of Article 3 determine their rights and obligations under the writing. Upholding the
parties choice is not inconsistent with Article 3. Such an agreement may
bind a transferee of the writing if the transferee has notice of it or the
agreement arises from usage of trade and the agreement does not violate
other law or public policy. An example of such an agreement is a provision that a transferee of the writing has the rights of a holder in due
course stated in Article 3 if the transferee took rights under the writing
in good faith, for value, and without notice of a claim or defense.
U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2. It would seem that this expression of the drafters' intent
would preclude a rebirth of the negotiability by contract controversy that existed
under the Negotiable Instruments Law. See generally, Frederick K Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. REV. 205 (1934). Not all would agree, however, with
the drafters' choice. See William E. Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability-The
Negotiable Instruments Law Compared with the Proposed Commercial Code, 26
ROCKY MNT. L. REV. 1, 32 (1953) (stating that the invitation to "courts to confer
upon various nonconforming writings, some of the attributes of negotiability, is
thoroughly unsound ... [and] should be struck from the Code.").

1995)

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

763

selves a universe of essential negotiability. That universe would enable a good faith purchaser of an intangible for the payment of money to cut off defenses of the obligor, ascertain the existence of prior
claims and assure against subordination to future claims. 64
A. Cutting Off Defenses of Obligors

By most accounts the so-called cut-off clause, by which the buyer
waived, against all assignees, any defenses which she might have
against the seller, was the central concept through which sales finance companies were able to develop into national enterprises. 65
Their ultimate financial success depended in great measure upon
their being able to achieve free-of-defenses status on both the money
claim and on the security agreement. The idea of inserting a waiver
of defenses provision into the conditional sale contract appealed to
the legal imagination, for, if it proved successful, it would at once
free finance companies from buyers' defenses even in those jurisdictions where title retention clauses rendered the sales notes nonnegotiable66 and despite the refusal of courts to apply the "imparting negotiability" doctrine to conditional sales. 67
Initially, the courts' response to cut-off clauses was less than
favorable. It was inevitable that this attempt to waive defenses
would ultimately draw into question the ability of parties to make
instruments negotiable by contract. Indeed, the idea that these
clauses were an attempt to circumvent the mandatory nature of the

64. To be sure, it may be possible to achieve by contract a number of other
attributes of negotiability; some of which may depend upon the existence of a
writing. For example, the rules as to alteration and incomplete instruments would
seem to make sense only if the contract is embodied in a written document. See
U.C.C. § 3-407. For present purposes it will be sufficient if we limit our discussion
to only those attributes that we have identified as essential to a universe of negotiability.
65. See Gilmore, supra note l, at 1093-98.
66. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 218 P.2d 181 (Kan.
1950) (holding that conditional sales contract destroyed negotiability of note); Central Nat. Bank v. Hubbel, 154 N.E. 551 (Mass. 1927); Polk County State Bank of
Cookston v. Walters, 176 N.W. 496 (Min. 1920). But see Chicago Ry. Equipment
Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 136 U.S. 268 (1890) (holding that a conditional sales contract does not destroy negotiability of note); Howard v. Simpki~, 69 Ga. 773
(1882); Burnley v. Tufts, 5 So. 627 (Miss. 1888).
67. The "imparting negotiability" doctrine provided that if a negotiable note
and mortgage are given by the debtor, the negotiability of the note will be "imparted" to the mortgage, so that both can be transferred free of outstanding equities and defenses. See 127 A.L.R. 190 (1940). For some unknown reason the doctrine was never applied to conditional sale contracts. See Gilmore, supra note 1, at
1094.
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Negotiable Instruments Law by creating a new type of negotiable
instrument won judicial endorsement in several jurisdictions.68 Despite this early resistance, between 1930 and 1940 the tide turned
and a majority of courts ultimately honored the effectiveness of waiver of defenses clauses embodied in nonnegotiable instruments. 69
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the no negotiability by contract
assault on cut-off clauses, courts sometimes said that the defense of
fraud could not be waived. 70 By contrast, a contractual waiver was
effective to bar a simple breach of warranty defense. It seems clear
that although the finance companies would have preferred a fully
negotiable instrument, the protection they received from the cut-off
clause was probably all the protection they needed in the vast majority of cases.
All of this being said, perhaps the most persuasive evidence of
the capacity of parties to waive defenses by contract today is the
most obvious one: U.C.C. section 9-206. Under this section, one is
entitled to the status of a holder in due course if the following conditions are met:
[A]n agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against any assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller is enforceable by an assignee who takes his
assignment for value, in good faith, and without notice of ~
claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be
asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instru~
ment under the article on commercial paper (Article 3 of this
title). 71

68. See, e.g., American Nat1 Bank v. Sommerville, Inc., 216 P. 376 (Cal.
1923); Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 298 P. 705 (Wash. 1931); Progressive Finance & Realty Co. v. Stempel, 95 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933).
69. See Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1096-97.
70. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1096.
71. U.C.C. § 9-206. In the context of consumer transactions, there has long
been recognition of the need for greater protection against unscrupulous sellers.
For this reason many state legislatures have enacted statutes which prohibit waivers by consumers. See Ralph J. Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L.Q. 503 (1975); Alan
Schwartz, Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer
Sales, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REY. 499 (1974). In 1975, the Federal Trade Commission entered the fray with a rule that made it an unfair trade practice to attempt to deprive consumers of their defenses. See 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1994). See also
Michael F. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the Federal Trade Commission's Holder in
Due. Course Notice on a Negotiable Instrument: How Clever are the Rascals at the
FTC, 68 N.C. L. REV. 953.
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To be sure, the waiver of defense clause does not create a negotiable
instrument. But if it is used, it will make it possible to achieve one of
the most basic attributes of negotiability. 72 If the assignee would
otherwise qualify as a holder in due course, 73 she will take free of
"personal" defenses, but not "real" defenses. 74
This approach has a good deal to be said in its favor. Above all,
it is a plausible way for an assignee to take free of defenses in situations where there is no writing that embodies the underlying obligation. Although it is common parlance to speak of a waiver of defense
or cut off clause, there is no requirement that it be in writing. 75 And
if it need not be evidenced by a writing, the "agreement" can be manifested orally or can come from other relevant circumstances including trade usage, course of dealing and, as the Code now reads,
maybe course of performance. 76
There are, however, at least two problems with this approach.
First, the need for certainty in this area may call for an easy way to
ascertain whether the debtor did, in fact, waive defenses. Absent a
written waiver, how can this be accomplished? The resolution of this
problem might well call for an understanding of modern communication and storage technologies. These include "magnetic media, optical
discs, digital voice messaging systems, electronic mail, audio tapes
and photographic media, as well as paper."77 Thus, whether or not

72. In the absence of such an agreement "the rights of an assignee are subject to all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and
any defense or claim arising therefrom; and any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which arose before the account debtor receives
notification of the assignment." U.C.C. § 9-318(1).
73. Query whether for purposes of section 9-206 the definition of value in
section 3-303 controls, rather than the general definition of value appearing in
section 1-201(44).
74. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
75. Moreover, if it is in writing it need not be conspicuous. See, e.g., Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A v. Coleman, 496 A2d 935 (R.I. 1985).
76. Although the definition of "agreement" in section 1-201(3) includes usage
of trade, course of dealing and course of performance, the definition of course of
performance appears in section 2-208 and the concept is conspicuously absent from
the interpretational priority set out in section 1-205(4). See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 2208, 1-205(4). It is therefore open to question whether course of performance was
intended to be part of the definition of agreement when that term appears outside
of Article 2. Recently, the AB.A Article 1 Task Force recommended to the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. that the definition of course of performance be
relocated to Article 1 and that section 1-205 be amended accordingly. The Permanent Editorial Board has accepted this recommendation.
77. Proposed Comment Language, submitted by Professor Patricia B. Fry to
the Reporters for the Limited Liability Company and U.C.C. Article 5 Drafting
Committees.
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the debtor's agreement is in writing, there may be a "record" of the
agreement. 78
Another strategy for overcoming this problem might be. to have
the waiver of defenses reflected in a trading partner agreement. 79
This agreement would structure the relationship between the debtor
and its original creditor and would act as a source of information for
interested third parties. Of course, the idea of a separately negotiated
trading partner agreement only makes sense if the original parties
intend to transact business on a somewhat regular basis.
The second problem with the section 9-206 approach is its scope.
In some cases the debtor will be neither a buyer or a lessee. 80 The
creditor might, for example, have a claim against the debtor for services rendered. Although this claim would be an Article 9 account, 81
it would not seem to be within the contemplation of section 9-206.
Although a broader scope to section 9-206 would have the virtue of
simplicity and ease of application it would seem that essential negotiability could still be achieved. Recall that the official comment to
section 3-104 makes it explicitly clear that notwithstanding the

78. The term "record" will appear in the Code for the first time when revised Article 5 (Letters of Credit) receives final approval by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See
U.C.C. § 5-102(14) (Proposed Draft 1994). That section will read as follows: "Record
means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in au
electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." Id. We anticipate that the same term will also appear in the other Code Articles under revision
and ultimately as one of the general definitions in section 1-201. All of this makes
it clear that a writing is but one of many possible forms of record.
79. See generally Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data Interchanqe Agreements:
Private Contracting Toward a Gl-Obal Environment, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 31
(1992). Boss writes:
The terms trading partner agreement and interchange agreement are generally used interchangeably, the former being the preferred American usage
and the latter the international formulation. Arguably, however, the terms
may reflect a difference in approach: the trading partner agreement referring to any agreement structuring the relationship between the trading
partners, whether arising from the exchange of electronic information or
not, and the interchange agreement being restricted to the exchange of information electronically.
Id. at 37-38 n.27.
80. Originally, section 9-206 only referred to buyers. Lessees were included
in 1962 because of the "substantial growth in lease financing and the quite parallel application of problems dealt with by this section to both conditional sale contracts and leases." 4 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-206, at 197-99
(2d ed. 1971). In the case of a finance lease under Article 2A, a "hell or high
water clause," is made a part of every agreement. See U.C.C. § 2A-407(1).
81. See id. § 9-106.
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parties' ability to contract into Article 3 they are nevertheless free to
contract for the various attributes of negotiability. 82 To accord such
power to the parties would suggest that with the passage of new
Article 3, section 9-206 has become redundant. 83 But the statement
about negotiability has been relegated to a comment, and there is as
yet no clear answer to this question.
Because the ability to recover the full amount of the underlying
claim is what is crucial here, the assignee's position is enhanced
considerably by the warranties that it receives from its assignor. An
assignor impliedly warrants that the assigned right is subject to no
defenses or claims good against the assignor. 84 Moreover, the assignee may require warranties in addition to those implied by law.85 For
example the assignee can demand an express warranty that the obligor is solvent and that she will perform her obligation. 86
In sum, an assignee of a claim can minimize the risk of nonpayment by capitalizing on the warranties-express and implied-given
by the assignor. Even if the obligor can successfully resist payment,
the assignor stands as an alternative source of recovery. An approach
of this sort appears to be a reasonable substitute for negotiability.
B. Competing Claims of Ownership
The competing claims problem has two dimensions: one who
acquires an obligation by assignment (a) has to be protected against
claims of ownership predicated on events which occurred prior to the

82. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
83. Comment 1 to section 9-206 explains that the section was intended to
settle the negotiability by contract debate. It states: "These clauses have led to litigation and their present status under the case law is in confusion. In. some jurisdictions they have been held void as attempts to create negotiable instruments '
outside the framework of Article 3 or on the grounds of public policy. In others
they have been allowed to operate. . . ." U.C.C. § 9-206 cmt. 1.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 333(1).
Compare this warranty with that given by the transferor of an negotiable instrument without an indorsement. Such a person warrants, among other things, that
"the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim in recoupment of any party
which can be asserted against the warrantor. . . ." U.C.C. § 3-416(aX4).
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 333 cmt.
b. ("The rules stated in this Section can be varied by agreement. Express warranties are created in the same ways as express warranties in the transfer of
goods. . . .").
86. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-415(a) ("[I]f an instrument is dishonored, an indorser is
obliged to pay the amount due on the instrument . . . according to the terms of
the instrument at the time it was indorsed. . . ."). The words "with recourse" ordinarily constitute such a guarantee of payment. See e.g., Ranchers Bank v. Pressman, 97 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1971).
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assignment, and (b) has to be protected against claims of ownership
predicated on events which occur subsequent to the assignment. It is
commonly believed that the transformation of an intangible claim
into a negotiable instrument is the principle means of coping with
both aspects of the problem. As we explain, however, modern concepts of property and contract together with the existence of .the
Article 9 filing system protect the expectations of current assignees
at least as well as the negotiability system, permitting them to acquire and retain most rights to payment free from the interference of
others.
1. Existing Claims of Ownership

According to the traditional conception of the good faith purchase doctrine, only the transfer of a negotiable instrument ensures
that the purchaser will take free of existing claims of ownership.87
Yet, despite its wideniable advantages, the negotiability system is
generally unsuited to handle this problem. No one has placed greater
stress on this particular point than James S. Rogers. 88
Rogers points to the rather obvious fact that the advantages of
holder in due course status are unobtainable unless the transferee of
the instrument first becomes a holder. 89 That is, unless the instrument is properly negotiated, the significant benefits that accrue to a
holder in due course are lost. 90 Problems can arise because an instrument in order form can only be negotiated if properly indorsed. 91
Thus, if an order instrument is stolen or if the true owner's agent
indorses in excess of authority, no subsequent transferee can become
a holder. 92 This means that in a vast array of disputes involving

87. See e.g., William F. Willier, Nonnegotiable Instruments, 11 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 13, 24 (1959) ("Negotiable" in its most important sense means the ability of a
transferee to acquire greater contract and property rights than his transferor
had."). See also supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
88. See generally James Steven Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title
Recognition, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 197 (1987).
89. Id. at 211. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (" '[H)older in due course' means the
holder of an instrument. . . .").
90. How an instrument is negotiated will depend on whether it is in bearer
or order form. If in order form "negotiation requires transfer of possession of the
instrument and its endorsement by the holder. If an instrument is payable to
bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone." U.C.C. § 3-201(b).
See also id. § 1-201(20) (stating the definition of the term "holder").
91. Id. § 1-201(20).
92. See id. §§ 1-201(43) ("'Unauthorized' signature means one made without
actual, implied, or apparent authority and includes a forgery."); 3-403(a) (1990)
("Unless otherwise provided in this Article or Article 4, an unauthorized signature
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conflicting ownership claims "the effect of the rules of transfer of
negotiable instruments is precisely the opposite of that assumed by
the usual assertions: the negotiability rules ensure that any subsequent parties, even bona fide purchasers, will take subject to the
prior ownership claim."93
Suppose, however, that the obligation is not embodied in a negotiable instrument. The risk to the transferee is not that the obligation was previously stolen, which concededly would be impossible
since there is nothing tangible to steal,94 but rather there still may
be the risk that the assignment is being made by one without appropriate authority. But this risk is independent of the form that the
obligation tak.es. 95 Ironically, as it turns out, if the obligation has
been transformed into a negotiable instrument courts may actually
be less willing to find authority to transfer than they would in other
circumstances. 96 In the end, this may mean that the transferee who
relies on the negotiability system for protection may actually find
herself at a disadvantage.
Consider next, by contrast, prior equitable claims of ownership. 97 Certainly a holder in due course will take free of these
claims. 98 But to understand and evaluate the need for negotiability

is ineffective. . . .").

93. Rogers, supra note 88, at 213.
94. To say this is not to deny that a situation similar to theft might not
occur. Suppose, for example, that prior to the assignment to X the assignor had
previously assigned the same claim to Y. In such a case, could it not be said that
the assignor is attempting to steal the interest already granted to Y? Because
discussion of this issue will inevitably involve the Article 9 filing system we reserve it for later in the article. See infra Part IV.B.2.
95. This is a matter of agency law, not negotiable instruments law or the
law governing any other type of transfer. "Thus, the position of a transferee of a
negotiable instrument ·in order form that was transferred by an agent in excess of
the agent's actual authority is at best the same as that of a transferee of any
other form of property in such circumstances." Rogers, supra note 88, at 212.
96. Rogers notes that "the field of negotiable instruments law has provided
what may be the most extreme instance of narrow construction of an agent's authority known to American law." Rogers, supra note 88, at n.62.
97. Rogers refers to these claims as "secret equities," and makes the point
that this category of claims "is as broad as the inclination of the courts of equity
to lend their assistance to parties who have lost property, by some misfortune or
equity." Rogers, supra note 88, at 202.
98. See U.C.C. § 3-306. Section 3-306 states:
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a
holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory
right in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a
negotiation and to recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having
rights of a holder in due course takes free of the claim to the instrument.
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in this context, attention must focus on whether the assignee would
take subject to these claims if no negotiable instrument were involved. To be sure, there was a time when the interest of a bona fide
purchaser would be subordinate to latent equities, but that is no
longer true. 99 One of the more explicit articulations of the current
state of the law is found in the Restatement (Second) Contracts:
If an assignor's right against the obligor is held in trust or
constructive trust for or subject to a right of avoidance or
equitable lien of another than the obligor, an assignee does
not so hold it if he gives value and becomes an assignee in
good faith and without notice of the right of the other. 100

Two quite general conclusions emerge from the discussion so far.
First, even the transferee of a negotiable instrument may be vulnerable to competing claims of ownership. To that extent, the form that
the underlying obligation takes is irrelevant. Second, holder in due
course status is not the only shield that protects transferees against
latent equities. The bona fide purchase doctrine will provide the
transferee with the same degree of protection.
2. Future Claims of Ownership
It seems clear that once a monetary obligation has been transformed into a negotiable instrument the only effective way to deal
with the underlying claim will be to deal with the instrument. In
other words, the only way to transfer the claim is to transfer the
instrument.1° 1 This explains why, with some exceptions, the holder
of the instrument will be the only one with any rights on it and the
only one who can enforce payment of the obligation. 102 It also means
that to be a holder one must have possession of the instrument. 103

Id.

99. Originally, it was thought that the assignee received merely an equitable
interest. See supra text accompanying notes 28-36. This meant that it was subject
to all prior equities. 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 413-415 (1st ed.
1881) ("where there are equal equities, the first in order of time shall prevail.").
Today, the interest is considered to be legal and, as such, is not subject to prior
equities of the assignee. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text; infra notes
105-12 and accompanying text.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 343.
101. This is true whether or not the transfer is voluntary. Ha creditor wishes
to get at the value of the underlying claim, she must first gain possession of the
instrument. s. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' AND DEBTORS'
PROTECTION 173 n.2 (3d ed. 1979).
102. See U.C.C. § 3-301 ("Person Entitled to Enforce Instrument").
103. The holder of a negotiable instrument "means the person in possession if
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The central point is this: rightful possession of the paper guarantees
priority over prior and subsequent assignees of the same claim. By
taking and keeping possession of the instrument, the holder can
effectively ensure that no competing claimant can achieve have priority.104
The priority of competing assignees of a nonnegotiable chose has
always been considerably more complex. The problem here is that
there are at least three common law approaches that a court can take
to decide this type of case. A court can apply the "New York"
rule, 105 the "English" rule, 106 or what is alternatively referred to
as the "Massachusetts" or "four horsemen" rule. 107 In this legal environment an assignee faces two difficulties. First, there is no effective way for him to learn whether the same claim had been assigned
previously. Second, even in the absence of a prior assignment, the
assignee may find its interest subordinated to a subsequent assignee.
Given such a regime, we may wonder whether the negotiability system provides the only effective mechanism of title assurance.
There is a ready answer to this question. Clearly, with the promulgation of Article 9 of the Code we now have a system of title
assurance which will provide the assignee with the information and
protection she needs. Although the most obvious application of Article
9 is to consensual liens on personal property, its scope is not so limit-

the instrument is payable to bearer or, in the case of an instrument payable to an
identified person, if the identified person is in possession." Id. § 1-201(20).
104. As Rogers explains: "[T]he rule that interests in negotiable instruments
can be effectuated only by possession of the instrument provides a simple mechanism of title assurance." Rogers, supra note 88, at 205.
105. The "New York" rule is a first-in-time rule. It is premised on the idea
that after the first assignment, there would be nothing left for the assignor to
assign. See, e.g., Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 AD. 525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1925).
106. The "English" rule too favors the first-in-time assignee. The difference
between it and the New York rule is that under the former, the second assignee
can achieve priority by being the first to notify the obligor of the assignment. See
Dearle v. Hall, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1828).
107. See Rabinowitz v. People's Nat'l Bank, 126 N.E. 289 (Mass. 1920). This
is the rule that we find in the Restatement. The first assignee prevails, unless:
[T]he subsequent assignee in good faith and without reason to know of
the prior assignment gives value and obtains
(i) payment or satisfaction of the obligation,
(ii) judgment against the obligor,
(iii) a new contract with the obligor by novation, or
(iv) possession of a writing of a type customarily accepted as a
symbol or as evidence of the right assigned.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 342.

772

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

ed. It also covers sales of accounts. 108 Thus, if the assigned right to
payment is an account the first assignee who files a financing
statement wins. 109 In light of this, a potential assignee can determine from the appropriate filing office exactly where it will stand
following the assignment. If there are no financing statements on file,
the assignee can ensure its priority by filing immediately. 110 What
we have, therefore, is a system which, if not superior to the negotiability system, m will reduce t4e cost of uncertainty just as well. 112
V. CONCLUSION
According to a well-worn epigram we learn nothing from history except that we learn nothing from history. If, however,
such learning were possible, future developments might take
place with less grinding of gears. The law will continue to
make, regardless of precedents and statutes, the necessary
accommodation to changing practice. There must be a time lag
in adjusting to a new way of doing business; just as it took a
few years or more for the law to recognize that an automobile
(although it has four wheels) is not in all respects like a horse
(which has four legs). But admitting the time lag, the adjustment can be made with relative ease and at little cost; or it

108. Article 9 applies:
[T]o any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property . . . and also to any sale of chattel
paper.
U.C.C. § 9-102. An " '[a]ccount means any right to payment for goods sold or
leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel
paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance.' "Id. § 9-106.
109. See id. § 9-312(5). There is no need to file, however, if the assignment
"does not alone or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee
transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts of the assignor." Id. § 9302(i)(c).
110. The assignee can even file before the assignment is made. See id. § 9402(1).
111. Indeed, there are those who argue that the benefits of the Article 9
filing system outweigh those of the negotiability system. See Clark, supra note 19,
at 473-479; Rogers, supra note 88, at 202-209.
112. One might object that this conclusion ignores the fact that not all monetary claims are accounts. If a non-account is assigned, the priority of successive
assignees would be determined according to whichever common law rule is followed
by the particular jurisdiction. See supra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
While this is presently true, it should be noted that the Article 9 Drafting Committee has tentatively decided to include within the scope of Article 9 the outright
sale of all rights to the payment of moneY,.
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can be made roughly and at the cost of a great deal of litigation. The more readily we can accept as a basic proposition,
that the corpus of the law is a floating mass and not a solid
body, the more easily will the necessary changes be made,
and, paradoxically, the greater will be the real, as distinguished from the apparent certainty. 113
Grant Gilmore wrote those words forty years ago. Then, he worried about whether, with the adoption of the new Uniform Commercial Code, the law would be able to keep pace with evolving commercial practices. This symposium proves that his concern is not any less
valid today. As commercial practice becomes more electronic, the
challenge will be to adjust our traditional paper-based rules to keep
pace with this new way of transacting business.
It is beyond question that the formal requirement that a negotiable instrument must be written cannot accommodate electronic
messaging technologies. But it must be recognized that the question
is not an all-or-nothing one between traditional negotiability and no
negotiability. The barriers to "essential" negotiability outside of the
traditional negotiability system have shrunk considerably since the
system was first developed. Excessive focus on what constitutes a
writing has, therefore, obscured the field. This Article has argued
that it may be time to abandon our efforts to somehow make paperbased rules fit electronic commerce, while accepting other common
law and statutory concepts for what they can accomplish. If the, response to electronic commerce is new legislation, we hope that our
analysis will provide a foundation on which appropriate legislation
can be based.

113. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1107.

